What ever happened to ... Verizon Wireless and their "open" network?

With much fanfare, Verizon Wireless announced a plan to open their network in November 2007 (see this). A podcast I was listening to today lamented that Google's Nexus One has become a GSM-only developer phone (despite the success of the Android platform on CDMA). This caused me to wonder about what happened to device portability on CDMA ... I have seen or read precious little about this project since then.

So was the Nov 2007 announcement a public relation stunt to appease regulators? Was it more difficult to implement device portability on CDMA more difficult than they had imagined? Did consumer interest in portability not materialize?

Verizon + Google = Western Union + Associated Press

This report of talks between Verizon, who operates one of the largest Tier 1 ISPs, and Google,arguably the largest provider of Internet content, is eerily reminiscent of the deal between Western Union and the Associated Press. You can read the background here, but the basic story outline is as follows:

1) As early as 1846, newspapers saw the economic benefit of sharing the cost of gathering and sending news from different locations. Instead of having one reporter for each newspaper in each location, they needed only to have one reporter in each location.

2) As telegraph emerged as an important information transmission medium, newspapers saw the advantage of using this to distribute news more quickly

3) Telegraph became economically concentrated (as infrastructure industries tend to do) and the economics of newsgathering also led to concentration

4) By 1870, WU was a de facto monopoly and AP was the dominant news gathering agency

5) WU, with agents in every town, had the infrastructure to enter the newsgathering business, and AP generated enough traffic to sustain a private or even rival telegraph network.

6) Instead of entering each other's markets, they basically entered into an exclusivity and non-compete agreement. WU would not get into newsgathering, and AP would not build or use another telegraph system (see this for the gory details)

Now, substitute "Verizon" for "WU" and "Google" for "AP", change the dates, and do you now get something like the NYT story cited above?

Are mobile "bar codes" a new standards battle?

On a recent canal tour in Amsterdam, I noticed a QR code emblazoned on the side of a canal. At the recent Google I/O meeting, participants were given T-shirts with these codes on them. The Pittsburgh Post Gazette also prints a QR code on the front page.

If you haven't interacted with these, the basic idea is that you can, through your mobile phone, use the code to access information. You need a code scanner/interpreter on your phone, which takes images from the phones camera, decodes them, and then passes the decoded information to your phone's web browser, which then calls up the web site via your wireless Internet connection.

Microsoft has developed a denser code which it is trying to popularize. This code uses colors and other shapes as opposed to the black-and-white squares used by QR codes. It is not hard to conclude that this Microsoft code is in many ways superior since it can encode more information for a given surface area.

On the canal tour, I started to wonder whether this is the latest incarnation of the standards battles, the most famous of which is BetaMax vs. VHS, and the most recent of which is HD-DVD vs. Blu-Ray. In this case, QR codes seem to have the early lead because of their popularity in Japan, because they can be printed in black and white, and because they have (implicitly) Google's backing. Microsoft, for its part, has given away the required mobile phone software but must now convince publishers and content providers to use its code.

Is it a standards battle? Is it one that is already over or will Microsoft's technology win the day in the end?

Google's Nexus One and unsubsidized handsets

I found this item over at the Technology Liberation Front interesting and worth reading. The article points out that the primary cause of Google's failed experiment is Americans' unwillingness to give up subsidies. This may well be largely true, but it fails to capture other aspects of the American telecom environment and this particular experiment that are also contributing factors.

My last two handsets have been unsubsidized and unlocked (by choice), and yes, one of them is a Nexus One. My carrier (AT&T) does not give me a discount for an unsubsidized handset, so I am paying the monthly price assuming I had a subsidized handset. In a sense, then, I am paying twice. I chose this route not for lower cost (obviously) but for flexibility. I am now free to use SIM cards of my choosing and I have a month-to-month contract, which I also like.

The other aspect of the Google experiment is that consumers did not have the opportunity to "try before buy". The brick-and-mortar retail experience does allow this while the virtual one does not. For a complex product like a smart phone, user experience is key (a lesson that Steve Jobs taught us). User experience cannot be assessed via a web page, no matter how well designed it is.

Apple, Google, AT&T and Verizon

This article over at Seeking Alpha is interesting. It describes the "small numbers bargaining problem" in telecom. Quoting the article:

Verizon has already shown resistance to putting the Apple iPhone on its platform for fear that it will use tremendous amounts of data without sharing any of the third party application profits with the carrier. Now VZ is beginning to play games with Google saying that they won’t pick up the Nexus One, planned to be released spring of 2010. Google loses access to the carrier’s more than 90 million users, and seems to have stumbled for the time being in becoming a major player in the mobile handset market.

AT&T has not picked up the phone either. But AT&T has more problems than just Google, they are trapped in a mutually hated relationship with Apple now, where neither party can get rid of the other. It really is the marriage from hell. Apple doesn’t have another carrier, and AT&T can’t throw Apple off for fear that its massive amount of iPhone users will defect from its completely inferior network. So AT&T is trapped having to provide Apple with more and more bandwidth, towers and other infrastructure, as the public and media scream at AT&T to get their network up to Verizon’s standards, not to even mention how well Sprint (S) works. AT&T is for sure frustrated that they have to make these capital expenditures and see no increased profit from them, it’s like bailing out the water from a ship with a 20 foot hole in the bottom. You’re just spending energy trying to stay afloat.

Something has to give here, this can’t go on forever, and I think we are soon to see a resolution to the issue of the telecom giants paying for the network on which Apple and Google make tremendous amounts of money. Maybe the telecoms chose the nuclear option and just stop building their networks holding Apple’s feet to the fire. Steve Jobs can’t revolutionize the content distribution market without a network to do it on, and believe me, the stuff that he wants to do is going to take a lot more bandwidth than is available today. Do we really think the carriers are going to pay for that to happen? Maybe Apple will buy a carrier, or perhaps even build its own network with a next generation technology they have been developing.

I wonder to what extent the independent LTE network proposed by Harbinger (see this) will be the event that shakes things up? In many ways, the situation described above seems to be an analog of the drama being played out over network neutrality in that we have infrastructure investments required for applications that are not easily monetized by the infrastructure owners.

Android and standards sponsorship

The story of Google's "sponsorship" of Android has been making the rounds on various mobile phone and gadget websites in the past days. This story appears to be the source. The essence of the story is this:

In just 18 months, the number of Google (NSDQ: GOOG) Android phones being shipped has soared to 60,000 a day, and over that period countless new devices have been released by handset makers for sale by carriers worldwide.

Nothing typically moves this fast in wireless. So how has Google done it?

Well, at least part of the answer appears to be that Google is sharing advertising revenues with carriers that use Android, according to multiple sources who are familiar with the deals. In some cases, sources said, Google is also cutting deals with the handset makers. The revenue-sharing agreements only occur when the handsets come with Google applications, like search, maps and gmail, since that is not a requirement of Android. Google declined to comment, and said terms of its agreements with partners are confidential.

When researchers began studying standards in the 1985-1995 timeframe (see, for example papers by me, Joe Farrell, Garth Saloner, Michael Katz, Carl Shapiro, Marvin Sirbu, Michael Spring and others), we focussed on understanding the market dynamics of standards wars -- why did one standard dominate the market? How did markets prone to standardization behave? Why do firms use the committee process and what is effective in this process?

Mobile phone operating systems for smart phones arguably represent a market prone to standardizations because of the application ecosystem demanded by users and because of the operating efficiencies demanded by carriers. So, why is Android succeeding where WebOS is struggling? One of the significant answers to this question is sponsorship. The endorsement of key handset manufacturers would encourage carriers to adopt the handsets because of operating efficiencies; however, that is perhaps a weaker form of sponsorship. Google's more overt sponsorship is far more compelling because it results in direct revenues for carriers and would account for the more enthusiastic reception of Android. In contrast, Palm has arguably a superior operating system in WebOS (also Linux-based) but does not have the resources to credibly sponsor its OS. As a result, its system and phones have received an embrace by carriers that is far more lukewarm than Android; indeed, it is perhaps only because of its compelling OS that Palm is getting any interest at all! Its Treo Pro phone, based on Windows Mobile, was treated with much less interest than its WebOS phones.

It is nice when reality lines up with theory!

Lock-in and smart phones

This item over at Ars Technica is interesting. The article itself is an analysis of Palm's WebOS and why it failed to attain economic success. While many articles have been written about this (and even though the reports of Palm's death may be premature), I found this section of the article most interesting:

In at least one way, Palm's webOS was a victim of its own success. I ultimately found that the Pre's thoroughgoing cloud orientation, which I made a big deal about in my review of the device, meant that there was nothing tying me to Palm. And unfortunately for Palm, the Pre had to compete with client platforms from companies that also provided important cloud services, with the result that those providers could privilege their own clients and thereby gain a certain amount of vendor lock-in.

Three examples serve to illustrate my point that it was too easy to leave Palm, and that Palm's decision to be solely a client platform put it at a permanent, structural disadvantage against competition that offered both clients and services.

Back in January of this year, after unboxing my new, Google-provided Nexus One, I logged into a few accounts (Google, Facebook, Twitter, Evernote, Amazon) and voila—I had all my data on this new phone, along with my existing phone number (courtesy of Google Voice). Think about that for a moment: I ported all of my data and my phone number to a new phone on a new carrier, without so much as swapping a SIM card or calling a customer service number. And every cloud service that I used on Pre was immediately available on the Nexus One.

So it was that on the day that I got the Nexus One, I dropped my Pre in a drawer and didn't turn it on again for two months, all without missing a single message.

Leaving the iPhone was a lot harder, because—and this is my second example—I was in the habit of syncing my music with iTunes. iTunes syncing was the main way that Apple got its hooks into me, and everyone who followed the Apple vs. Palm battle over iTunes and Pre sync support knows that Apple guarded that key source of lock-in jealously.

....

In the end, Palm's fundamental problem wasn't the lack of reliable, first-party Google Voice or iTunes support, but the fact that Palm itself never offered a similarly essential service that it could use to lock users into the Pre. Google had Voice, Apple had iTunes, and Palm had nothing. The Pre didn't have first-party support for anything that I depended on or enjoyed, so it had no hold on me at all.

By not having any way at all to lock the user into webOS, Palm ended up betting the farm on the proposition that the Pre could and would deliver an overwhelmingly superior mobile client experience for a common slate of cross-platform cloud services. In other words, because Palm doesn't own any part of a user's data or identity, the user experience is the only thing that could tie a user to webOS.

There is economic research that supports the notion that lock-in is good and desirable for companies; in fact, companies work hard to achieve lock-in to avoid being commoditized. So, as we migrate to cloud-based services, how do firms and carriers create compelling lock-in for consumers? Is this a good thing for consumers?

One of the interesting things for me is that Google, with its Nexus One and Android experience, is trying to drive the value to the cloud through a device that works hard to NOT provide lock-in (i.e., contractual or standards), while Apple is trying to create as much lock-in as possible. This is no surprise, given their rather substantially different business models.

Google, Microsoft and the smart grid

I have been wondering why Google and Microsoft have been working hard to enter the "smart grid" market. This article over at Seeking Alpha provides the best explanation I have seen so far:

Google, Microsoft (MSFT), Intel (INTC) and others have all launched efforts to control how consumers and businesses monitor and analyze their energy consumption. Why the rush? Neither Google nor Microsoft will charge consumers for PowerMeter or Hohm. However, advertisers will likely pay both companies for the opportunity to hawk energy efficiency services and other energy-related products to consumers who use their respective consoles. Both companies will also mine the data (after it has been scrubbed to protect privacy) to utilities. Don't worry about a loss of dignity or privacy: you'll get a coupon for ten percent off on a new set of storm windows.

YouTube and IPv6

This article over at Network World is interesting. Quoting the article:

IPv6 traffic came into ISPs from all over the world when Google turned up its IPv6 traffic on YouTube," Levy says. "IPv6 is being supported at many different Google data centers. We're talking about a traffic spike that is 30-to-1 type ratios. In other words, 30 times more IPv6 traffic is coming out of Google's data centers than before.

That is some spike! It will be interesting to see if this applications (along with the other IPv6-enabled Google services) will be enough to build momentum for a large scale conversion to IPv6. This is a classic case of standards transition; it will be interesting to observe the dynamics.

The cost of customer service

This report on customer service problems Google is facing with its Nexus One phone is a case study on how success in one arena (software services) does not always translate well into another arena. Customer support is expensive. I remember reading cost studies of ISPs and telephone carriers in the 1990s that indicated that customer service accounts for 35-50% of total costs. What was memorable to me in those studies was that providing customer service was more expensive than operating the networks that the customers used! It seems that Google is learning this lesson now.

Singapore-Japan cable system

This article over at Telecommunications Online announced a new cable project, so I collected it here with my other similar announcements. Quoting the article:

Several Asian telcos and Google are to invest US$400million in a new subsea cable linking South East Asia to Japan aimed at providing the highest capacity connection link to-date. The South East Asia Japan Cable System (SJC) has a design capacity of 17 terabits per second with provision to be ramped up to 23 Tbps. As an example of its capacity, the bandwidth allows the SJC submarine cable system to handle 30 million high definition videos simultaneously.

The 8,300 km cable will link Singapore to Japan with branches to Indonesia, Philippines and Hong Kong initially. From Japan, it will be plugged into the recently commissioned trans-Pacific Unity cable to the USA, besides a branching link to Guam which is becoming an alternative cable junction linking Asia to USA.

Comprising 6-fiber pairs, the SJC cable is scheduled to be completed by the second quarter of 2012, and is believed to be modeled after the Unity business concept providing autonomy in operation for partners to the initiative.

The decision to proceed with this landmark project, no doubt, has been prompted by growing demand not only from Internet traffic but also from the surge in telco TV, games and enterprise data.

An earlier report by TeleGeography shows that international Internet traffic has not been affected by the recent economic meltdown. In fact, international traffic growth was up 79 percent in 2009, from 61 percent in 2008.

By end 2009, fixed broadband in the Asia Pacific is expected to grow 17.3 percent to 182 million subscribers clocking billings of US$44.8 billion, according to Frost & Sullivan. The next generation networks in progress in South Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Australia will further fuel growth in fixed broadband, not counting the phenomenal surge in mobile broadband.

So this cable will cost a bit over $48,000 per kilometer. This is the first time I have seen the capacity of the cable described in terms of the number of HD television streams that can be supported; previously, it was always the number of simultaneous telephone calls.

Google and DNS

I found this commentary on Google's entry into the DNS domain the most worthwhile (from this article in the NY Times):

“You have to remember they are also the largest advertising and redirection company on the Internet. To think that Google’s DNS service is for the benefit of the Internet would be naïve,” Mr. Ulevitch wrote. “They know there is value in controlling more of your Internet experience and I would expect them to explore that fully.”

In an interview, Mr. Ulevitch said OpenDNS was steering customers who mistyped addresses to Yahoo search results and ads. “I have no doubt they see that as a competitive threat,” he said. He also stressed that there is valuable information in the DNS layer — like where servers are located, what Web sites people are looking at and how frequently they are looking at them. “I have no doubt they will be monetizing this by increasing intelligence on people’s surfing habits,” he said.

Ulevitch runs the "Open DNS", which has provided this service for some time. He differentiates Google DNS from Open DNS here; you should bear in mind that Google is offering him competition. Finally, I think it is important to remember, as Ulevitch does here, that Google is a profit-making organization.

Google, Android, maps and more

I have been interested in Google's approach to business and, like others, have been a bit wary about it as well (See this search of this blog for more).  Thus, this item resonated with me, especially in combination with this item from the Washington Post (please be sure to read this follow-on from Tech Crunch in the spirit of completeness). This article over in BusinessWeek is another piece of the puzzle, I think, considering that gaming is a major profit business.

It seems clear that Google is building a platform and ecosystem. It is a for-profit corporation, so the question is not if but how this platform will be monetized, how it will compete with other platforms (Apple-centric and Microsoft-centric), and how switching costs will be imposed to deter defections from the platform. Google's interest in certain intellectual property around Android provides some evidence of this. Will monetization come from advertising revenues? Or will we see a series of user fees that will emerge after users are invested in the platform?

The questions matter because our government has historically gotten interested in platform competition and how it relates to control. These questions will be at the core of future anti-monopoly policy, I believe.

iPhone Apps and the war for the web

There are a couple of items that have come to my attention recently that suggest change is on the way for app stores (perhaps the iPhone app store in particular):  The first comes by way of Seeking Alpha.  In it, the author cites this item from Gizmodo, which argues that, in the not to distant future, apps will be very cheap or free.  This has been a significant profit center for Apple, but may not be in the future.  The second item, from GigaOm, discusses the opaque approval process for iPhone apps which can be frustrating for developers.

Taken in tandem, the second item suggests higher than necessary transaction costs for developers (since the approval process is uncertain) and the first item suggests lower prices (tending to $0) because of competition.  High transaction costs for no profit suggests that developers will seek to monetize their investment in other ways, through advertising or through other kinds of tie-ins (where price is not $0) that are outside of the control of the app store.

But as O'Reilly points out, there are limits to this too.  Apple is not shy about blocking apps that try to escape their business model.  The O'Reilly article is interesting in that it argues for the shape of competition to come and makes the case for the tendency toward market concentration that we see in the Internet.

Clearwire and the future of WiMAX

This article over at Forbes is interesting:

In a note to clients, Stifel Nicolaus analyst Christopher King said the latest round of financing will probably not cover all of Clearwire's cash needs over the next few years. He expects the company to lose several billion more dollars.

But he added that "Clearwire needs to build out its nationwide network as quickly as possible, as both Verizon and AT&T will begin to quickly catch up with what we believe will likely be a superior 4G network."

Clearwire's second-quarter loss, though narrower than a year earlier, came to $73.4 million. The company reports third-quarter results after the closing bell Tuesday.

So, Sprint and Comcast are investing an additional US$1.5 billion. Google decided against upping their ante in the WiMAX provider. So, is this a near term play? Will Clearwire switch to LTE when they can or will they focus on fixed wireless broadband?

Google and Verizon

This joint statement is interesting less for what it says than for who is saying it (see also this item).

We can frame the net neut discussion as a faceoff between application providers and network operators about who gets to pay (and how much) -- i.e., we frame it as a problem in political economy. In that world, Google is the 800 kg gorilla amongst the apps provider and Verizon is the 800 kg gorilla (at least for a significant fraction of the US population) amongst the operators. An agreement between these two is likely to set the tone for the rest of the community (the joint statement is far from an agreement).

This is eerily reminiscent of the bargaining that took place between the Associated Press and Western Union in the 1860s. At the time, AP was WU's biggest customer, so AP had the traffic to build their own telegraph network; WU had the local resources (in telegraph operators) to build their own news agency. The agreement between the two was basically an agreement to not compete with each other in their core markets.

Is this shaping up to be a similar business arrangement? Are there parallels worth considering or is the WU/AP analogy worthless?

The principle of "good enough" and telecom networks

This article at the PFF website caught my attention. In the article, Adam Thierer, in reflecting on the recent Gmail outage, applies the ideas of this article from Wired to telecom. The telecom network has been engineered (at high cost) to 99.999% (i.e., "five nines") reliability; the question is whether this quality level is anywhere close to what is demanded by the market.

In some sense, we have a test case in that we are willing to consume different feature sets in telecom at different prices. Wireline telephony is the most reliable with the highest voice quality at price $x, mobile telephony is less reliable and has lower voice quality (with mobility) and is offered at price $y and VoIP has probably less reliability and lower quality than either at a lower price ($z). As a note, I don't think it is fair to say that $z=0 because we do pay for internet access and the computer that runs the VoIP software.

So is there only a marginal demand for quality, which might partially explain why wireline access lines are on the decline? Or is it strictly due to the substitution of mobile for wireline access?

Google voice and the iPhone

The dust-up around the Google Voice iPhone application has been fun to watch (see this for an update). There are many things going on here, including (possibly) AT&T's involvement (which both it and Apple deny). I found this item over at TechCrunch an interesting analysis of Apple's response to the FCC's inquiry.

I have to agree that it seems largely about Apple's control over users. AT&T would get either the data traffic or the voice traffic and, unless there is a serious difference in the profitability of one service over another, they should be largely indifferent.

Welcome to life in Apple's walled garden.

Update: The plot thickens ... according to this item, AT&T and Apple did have an agreement regarding VoIP, but it did not cover third party apps.

Availability in current cloud computing services

This article reports research performed in Australia looking at the availability of cloud services provided by Amazon, Google and Microsoft. Here is how the experiment was set up:

The team of researchers, led by the University of New South Wales (UNSW) and in collaboration with researchers at NICTA (National ICT Australia) and the Smart Services Cooperative Research Centre (CRC), have spent seven months stress testing Amazon's EC2, Google's AppLogic and Microsoft's Azure cloud computing services.

The analysis simulated 2000 concurrent users connecting to services from each of the three providers, with researchers measuring response times and other performance metrics.

Here are some things they found:

Response times on the service also varied by a factor of twenty depending on the time of day the services were accessed, she said.

The response times collated in Sydney were tested against measurement instruments loaded onto the cloud platform to isolate whether delays were attributable to the service itself or the latency involved with accessing US-based data centres from Australia.

and

None of the platforms have the kind of monitoring required to have a reasonable conversation about performance," she said. "They provide some level of monitoring, but what little there is caters for developers, not business users. And while Amazon provides a dashboard of how much it is costing you so far, for example, there is nothing in terms of forecasts about what it will cost you in the future.

New Undersea cable for Google

I have been posting regularly about undersea cables and also about Google's transmission capabilities. This item combines both. As we consider incentives and motivations, why would Google, an information provider, invest in infrastructure the way that they do?