With much fanfare, Verizon Wireless announced a plan to open their network in November 2007 (see this). A podcast I was listening to today lamented that Google's Nexus One has become a GSM-only developer phone (despite the success of the Android platform on CDMA). This caused me to wonder about what happened to device portability on CDMA ... I have seen or read precious little about this project since then.
So was the Nov 2007 announcement a public relation stunt to appease regulators? Was it more difficult to implement device portability on CDMA more difficult than they had imagined? Did consumer interest in portability not materialize?
Showing posts with label Android. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Android. Show all posts
20 July 2010
Mobile apps
If you have been following the standards battle between rival mobile operating systems, you will have noticed that one tie-in that the sponsors of each mobile OS touts is the number of apps that are available on their respective platform. This, along with complementary hardware, is an indicator of the size of the ecosystem, which is often a key determinant of a potential user's adoption decision (there are clearly others).
It should not come as a surprise that some observers, often advocates of those mobile OS's with the quantitatively smaller ecosystem, argue that the total number is less important that the number of useful apps. To that end the folks over at AppBrain used the data provided by their system (a subset of Android users) to plot the popularity of apps on the Android platform as measured by the number installed. The resulting curve looks perilously like a power law distribution ... as it should if you follow Chris Anderson's argument in the Long Tail.
It should not come as a surprise that some observers, often advocates of those mobile OS's with the quantitatively smaller ecosystem, argue that the total number is less important that the number of useful apps. To that end the folks over at AppBrain used the data provided by their system (a subset of Android users) to plot the popularity of apps on the Android platform as measured by the number installed. The resulting curve looks perilously like a power law distribution ... as it should if you follow Chris Anderson's argument in the Long Tail.
26 March 2010
Android and standards sponsorship
The story of Google's "sponsorship" of Android has been making the rounds on various mobile phone and gadget websites in the past days. This story appears to be the source. The essence of the story is this:
In just 18 months, the number of Google (NSDQ: GOOG) Android phones being shipped has soared to 60,000 a day, and over that period countless new devices have been released by handset makers for sale by carriers worldwide.
Nothing typically moves this fast in wireless. So how has Google done it?
Well, at least part of the answer appears to be that Google is sharing advertising revenues with carriers that use Android, according to multiple sources who are familiar with the deals. In some cases, sources said, Google is also cutting deals with the handset makers. The revenue-sharing agreements only occur when the handsets come with Google applications, like search, maps and gmail, since that is not a requirement of Android. Google declined to comment, and said terms of its agreements with partners are confidential.
When researchers began studying standards in the 1985-1995 timeframe (see, for example papers by me, Joe Farrell, Garth Saloner, Michael Katz, Carl Shapiro, Marvin Sirbu, Michael Spring and others), we focussed on understanding the market dynamics of standards wars -- why did one standard dominate the market? How did markets prone to standardization behave? Why do firms use the committee process and what is effective in this process?
Mobile phone operating systems for smart phones arguably represent a market prone to standardizations because of the application ecosystem demanded by users and because of the operating efficiencies demanded by carriers. So, why is Android succeeding where WebOS is struggling? One of the significant answers to this question is sponsorship. The endorsement of key handset manufacturers would encourage carriers to adopt the handsets because of operating efficiencies; however, that is perhaps a weaker form of sponsorship. Google's more overt sponsorship is far more compelling because it results in direct revenues for carriers and would account for the more enthusiastic reception of Android. In contrast, Palm has arguably a superior operating system in WebOS (also Linux-based) but does not have the resources to credibly sponsor its OS. As a result, its system and phones have received an embrace by carriers that is far more lukewarm than Android; indeed, it is perhaps only because of its compelling OS that Palm is getting any interest at all! Its Treo Pro phone, based on Windows Mobile, was treated with much less interest than its WebOS phones.
It is nice when reality lines up with theory!
12 January 2010
The cost of customer service
This report on customer service problems Google is facing with its Nexus One phone is a case study on how success in one arena (software services) does not always translate well into another arena. Customer support is expensive. I remember reading cost studies of ISPs and telephone carriers in the 1990s that indicated that customer service accounts for 35-50% of total costs. What was memorable to me in those studies was that providing customer service was more expensive than operating the networks that the customers used! It seems that Google is learning this lesson now.
18 December 2009
Mobile operating systems
There are two articles related to Mobile OS that caught my attention. This one, in Ars Technica, shows that, for the first time, the total number of iPhone users have passed the total number of Windows Mobile users. This one, over at CNN Money, shows the growth of Android-based devices. Clearly the flat Android line in the first article will change as 1.5+ and 2.x-based devices enter the marketplace and start gaining in installed base.
This is significant in a number of ways. First, installed base is a key factor in the development of the "ecosystem" of a device. Apple, which has locked down the hardware as well as the OS on the iPhone, enjoys an unrivaled hardware ecosystem from third parties. By tightly controlling the application environment, they maintain a strong grip on the app store, which enables them to monetize this very profitable aspect of the iPhone ecosystem. Because of the size and momentum of the installed base, they will attract more applications developers.
Android does not have the hardware control and has a more open approach to the app store which does not lend itself to monetization in the same way. However, the more open approach may attract more innovative app developers. There is clearly momentum in the Android OS camp, even if the installed base is lacking at present.
Carriers have an interest in minimizing the number of mobile OSs they support. Adding a new OS is costly because the features and services of the OSs must be tested with the network and supported by the carrier after the device is released. Thus, OSs with little installed base or momentum are at risk of losing their sponsors (the carriers) which leads to a self-reinforcing downward spiral in their ecosystem. Thus, the stakes for Microsoft in its Windows Mobile 7 (due in 2010) could not be higher; for that matter, the same is true for Palm's WebOS. Failure to attract a user base means failure to build an ecosystem.
This creates a high hurdle, but it is not insurmountable. At one time, the Palm OS was the standard with a huge catalog of applications; it is no longer so dominant. Thus, dominance is not permanent even if it can be a huge advantage in the market place
This is significant in a number of ways. First, installed base is a key factor in the development of the "ecosystem" of a device. Apple, which has locked down the hardware as well as the OS on the iPhone, enjoys an unrivaled hardware ecosystem from third parties. By tightly controlling the application environment, they maintain a strong grip on the app store, which enables them to monetize this very profitable aspect of the iPhone ecosystem. Because of the size and momentum of the installed base, they will attract more applications developers.
Android does not have the hardware control and has a more open approach to the app store which does not lend itself to monetization in the same way. However, the more open approach may attract more innovative app developers. There is clearly momentum in the Android OS camp, even if the installed base is lacking at present.
Carriers have an interest in minimizing the number of mobile OSs they support. Adding a new OS is costly because the features and services of the OSs must be tested with the network and supported by the carrier after the device is released. Thus, OSs with little installed base or momentum are at risk of losing their sponsors (the carriers) which leads to a self-reinforcing downward spiral in their ecosystem. Thus, the stakes for Microsoft in its Windows Mobile 7 (due in 2010) could not be higher; for that matter, the same is true for Palm's WebOS. Failure to attract a user base means failure to build an ecosystem.
This creates a high hurdle, but it is not insurmountable. At one time, the Palm OS was the standard with a huge catalog of applications; it is no longer so dominant. Thus, dominance is not permanent even if it can be a huge advantage in the market place
19 November 2009
Google, Android, maps and more
I have been interested in Google's approach to business and, like others, have been a bit wary about it as well (See this search of this blog for more). Thus, this item resonated with me, especially in combination with this item from the Washington Post (please be sure to read this follow-on from Tech Crunch in the spirit of completeness). This article over in BusinessWeek is another piece of the puzzle, I think, considering that gaming is a major profit business.
It seems clear that Google is building a platform and ecosystem. It is a for-profit corporation, so the question is not if but how this platform will be monetized, how it will compete with other platforms (Apple-centric and Microsoft-centric), and how switching costs will be imposed to deter defections from the platform. Google's interest in certain intellectual property around Android provides some evidence of this. Will monetization come from advertising revenues? Or will we see a series of user fees that will emerge after users are invested in the platform?
The questions matter because our government has historically gotten interested in platform competition and how it relates to control. These questions will be at the core of future anti-monopoly policy, I believe.
It seems clear that Google is building a platform and ecosystem. It is a for-profit corporation, so the question is not if but how this platform will be monetized, how it will compete with other platforms (Apple-centric and Microsoft-centric), and how switching costs will be imposed to deter defections from the platform. Google's interest in certain intellectual property around Android provides some evidence of this. Will monetization come from advertising revenues? Or will we see a series of user fees that will emerge after users are invested in the platform?
The questions matter because our government has historically gotten interested in platform competition and how it relates to control. These questions will be at the core of future anti-monopoly policy, I believe.
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)